Abstract. SIMON family is one of the recent lightweight block cipher designs introduced by NSA. So far there have been several cryptanalytic results on this cipher by means of differential, linear and impossible differential cryptanalysis. In this paper, we study the security of SIMON32, SIMON48/72 and SIMON48/96 by using integral, zero-correlation linear and impossible differential cryptanalysis. Firstly, we present a novel experimental approach to construct the best known integral distinguishers of SIMON32. The small block size, 32 bits, of SIMON32 enables us to experimentally find a 15-round integral distinguisher, based on which we present a key recovery attack on 21-round SIMON32, while previous best results only achieved 19 rounds. Moreover, we attack 20-round SI-MON32, 20-round SIMON48/72 and 21-round SIMON48/96 based on 11 and 12-round zero-correlation linear hulls of SIMON32 and SIMON48 respectively. Finally, we propose new impossible differential attacks which improve the previous impossible differential attacks. Our analysis shows that SIMON maintains enough security margin.
Introduction
Lightweight primitives are designed to be efficient for limited resource environments, but they should also ensure that the message is transmitted confidentially. Therefore, the vital design motivation is to maintain a reasonable trade-off between the security and performance. During recent years, many lightweight ciphers have been designed. Prominent examples are included but not limited to these: ICEBERG [2] , mCrypton [3] , HIGHT [4] , PRESENT [5] , KATAN [6] , LED [7] , Piccolo [8] , KLEIN [9] , EPCBC [10] , PRINCE [11] and TWINE [12] .
In 2013, NSA also proposed two families of highly-optimized block ciphers, SIMON and SPECK [13] , which are flexible to provide excellent performance in both hardware and software environments. Moreover both families offer large variety of block and key sizes such that the users can easily match the security requirements of their applications without sacrificing the performance. However, no cryptanalysis results are included in the specification of these algorithms.
Related Work and Our Contributions. On the one hand, several external cryptanalysis results on SIMON and SPECK were published. In [14, 15] , differential attacks are presented on various state sizes of SIMON and SPECK, while the best linear attacks on SIMON are given in [16] . In [17] Biryukov et al. exploit the threshold search technique [18] , where they showed better differential characteristics and proposed attacks with better results on several versions of SIMON and SPECK. Very recently, there are some differential attack results about SIMON32 and SIMON48 in ePrint [19] . These results need to be further verified although they seem intriguing.
In this paper, we investigate the security of SIMON32, SIMON48/72 and SI-MON48/96 by using integral, zero-correlation linear and impossible differential cryptanalysis. We firstly apply integral cryptanalysis. Regarding SIMON32, because the block size is only 32 bits, we can experimentally observe the behaviors of all the plaintexts under a fixed key. Our experiments show that the number of distinguished rounds rapidly increases when the number of active bits becomes close to the block size. On the contrary, exploiting integral distinguishers with a large number of active bits for recovering the key is hard in general. Indeed, our distinguisher needs 31 active bits. To make the data complexity smaller than the code book, we cannot iterate the analysis even for two sets of the distinguisher. We then exploit the fact that the key schedule consists of simple linear equations, and show that reducing any fraction of subkey space can immediately reduce the main key space by solving the linear equations with Gaussian elimination. By combining several known cryptanalytic techniques we present an attack on 21-round SIMON32/64. As for SIMON48, the approach cannot be applied due to the large search space. However, according to the experimental results for SIMON32, we may expect that there exist good integral distinguishers of SIMON48 when the number of active bits is near the block size.
Moreover, we construct 11 and 12-round zero-correlation linear hulls of SI-MON32 and SIMON48 respectively by using miss-in-the-middle technique. Then based on these distinguishers, we mount attacks on 20-round SIMON32, 20-round SIMON48/72 and 21-round SIMON48/96 delicately with the help of divide-and-conquer technique. Finally, we demonstrate impossible differential attacks on 18-round SIMON32, 18-round SIMON48/72 and 19-round SIMON48/96. Although these results are not better than the ones achieved by using differential, integral and zero-correlation linear cryptanalysis, they are the currently best impossible differential attacks for SIMON32 and SIMON48. Our improvements upon the state-of-the-art cryptanalysis for SIMON are given in Table 1 .
Organization. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give a brief description of SIMON. Section 3 covers the integral attack. In SIMON is a two-branch balanced Feistel network with simple round functions consisting of three operations: AND (&), XOR (⊕) and rotation (≪). In round i−1, by using a function
The output of the last round (L r , R r ) (r is the number of rounds) yields the ciphertext. The structure of the round function of SIMON is depicted in Figure 6 in Appendix A.
The key schedule of SIMON processes three different procedures depending on the key size. The first mn round keys are directly initialized with the main key, while the remaining key words are generated by three slightly different Table 2 . Notations: Top 8 are for general and bottom 4 are for integral attack.
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Let Λ be a collection of state vectors X = (x0, . . . , xn−1) where xi ∈ F2 is the i-th word of X: A if all i-th words xi in Λ are distinct, xi is called active B if the sum of all i-th words xi in Λ can be predicted, xi is called balanced C if the values of all i-th words xi in Λ are equal, xi is called passive/constant * if the sum of all i-th words xi in Λ can not be predicted procedures depending on the key words value m:
Here, the value c is constant 0xff . . . fc, and (z j ) i denotes the i-th (least significant) bit from one of the five constant sequences z j (0 ≤ j ≤ 4). The main key can be derived if any sequence of m consecutive subkeys are known.
Integral Cryptanalysis of SIMON
The integral attack [21, 22] first constructs an integral distinguisher, which is a set of plaintexts such that the states after several rounds have a certain property, e.g. the XOR sum of all states in the set is 0. Then, several rounds are appended to the distinguisher for recovering subkeys. In this section, we investigate the integral properties and present integral attacks on 21-round SIMON32/64.
Integral Distinguishers of SIMON32
We experimentally find integrals of SIMON32. The results are shown in Table 3 . Here the active bits are the ones in the input of round 1. An interesting observation is that the number of rounds increases rapidly when the number of active bits becomes close to the block size. Giving a theoretical reasoning for this observation seems hard. In other words, experimental approaches are useful for a small block size such that all plaintexts can be processed in a practical time. We explain the algorithm of our experiments as follows: As a result, we obtain a 15-round distinguisher ( Figure 1 ) with 31 active bits:
(CAAA, AAAA, AAAA, AAAA, AAAA, AAAA, AAAA, AAAA) → ( * * * * , * * * * , * * * * , * * * * , * B * * , * * * * , B * * * , * * * B).
The distinguisher in (1) is not ensured for all of 2 64 keys. Because our experiment did not return any failure, we expect that the success probability of this distinguisher is at least 1 − 2 −13 .
21-round Integral Attack of SIMON32/64
We use a 15-round integral distinguisher shown in Figure 1 . We first prepare 2 31 internal state values (X L X R ) in which 31 bits are active, then compute the
31 plaintexts yield balanced bits in 3 positions after 15 rounds, i.e. (L 15 , R 15 ). Moreover, the subsequent subkey XOR to R 15 in round 16 never breaks the balanced property as long as the number of plaintexts in a set is even. We then mount a key recovery attack on 21-round SIMON-32/64 by adding six rounds after the distinguisher, which is illustrated in Figure 2 Because the block size is 32 bits, the analysis with 2 31 plaintexts can be iterated at most twice, which implies that the 49-bit subkey space can be reduced at most 2 bits.
To detect the correct key, we further utilize the key schedule. 4 consecutive subkey values can reveal the main key value. We aim to recover 64 bits of k 17 , . . . , k 20 . Among 64 bits, 46 bits are suggested from the 6-round partial decryption. Moreover, because 5 subkeys k 16 , . . . , k 20 are linked only with linear equations, 3 bits of k 16,{8,14,15} can be converted to 3-bit information for the remaining 18 bits of k 17 , . . . , k 20 by solving linear equations with Gaussian elimination. Thus, for each of 49 subkey bits suggested by the 6-round partial decryption, the attacker can obtain 64 bits of k 17 , . . . , k 20 only by guessing 15-bit information of k 17 , . . . , k 20 , which leads to a faster key recovery attack than the exhaustive search.
Efficient Subkey Recovery.
To perform the 6-round partial decryption with 49-bit subkey guess with a straight-forward method, partial decryption for 2 31 ciphertexts with 2 49 guesses are performed, which requires 2 80 computations i.e. more than the exhaustive search. Several methods are known to reduce the complexity. Here, we use partial-sum [23] , meet-in-the-middle match [24] , and exploiting linearity for meet-in-the-middle match [25] .
The attack finds 49 subkey bits satisfying
Hence, we can compute the left-hand side and right-hand side of Equation (2) independently, and later find the match between two independent computations as the meet-in-the-middle attack. The computation of the left-hand and righthand side of Equation (2) is shown in the left and right part of Figure 3 , in which 42 bits of subkeys are involved respectively. Compared to the original 6-round partial decryption in Figure 2 , the number of related subkey bits are reduced from 49 to 42, which contributes to reduce the attack complexity. The complexity is further reduced by the partial-sum technique. Namely, every time subkey bits are guessed and state values are updated, we compress the amount of data only by keeping the state values appearing odd times. We then evaluate the computational cost. The unit is a single execution of 21-round SIMON32. Updating one bit of the state is equivalent to 1/(16 · 21) 21-round SIMON32 computation.
Step 1. 48 49-bit subkey candidates after analyzing a plaintext set, which is less than 2 51 bytes. The success probability is 1 − 2 −13 due to the probability of the 15-round distinguisher.
Zero-Correlation Linear Cryptanalysis of SIMON
The zero-correlation attack is one of the recent cryptanalytic method introduced by Bogdanov and Rijmen [26] . The attack is based on linear approximations with zero correlation (i.e. linear approximations with probability exactly 1/2). We introduce 11 and 12-round zero-correlation linear approximations of SIMON32 and SIMON48, based on which we present key recovery attacks on 20-round SIMON32, 20-round SIMON48/72 and 21-round SIMON48/96 respectively.
Zero-Correlation Linear Distinguishers of SIMON
By applying miss-in-the-middle technique, we construct 11-round zero-correlation linear hull for SIMON32 (see Figure 4 ). More specifically, this distinguisher con- ?000,0000,0?10,0000 0000,0000,1000,0000 0000,0000,0000,0000 0000,0000,1000,0000 0000,0000,0000,0001 0000,0000,0000,0000 0000,0000,0000,0001 0000,0000,0000,0001 sists of two parts: forward part (along the encryption direction) and backward part (along the decryption direction). For the forward part, we find that for any 6-round non-zero correlation linear hull with input mask being (0x0001,0x0000), the most significant bit of the left half of its output mask must be 0. As to the backward part, we observe that for any 5-round non-zero correlation linear hull with input mask being (0x0000,0x0080), the most significant bit of the left half of its output mask must be 1. Combining the above two parts, we can deduce that an 11-round linear hull with input and output masks being (0x0001,0x0000) and (0x0000,0x0080) must be a zero-correlation linear hull. Similarly, a 12-round zero-correlation linear hull for SIMON48 can be derived (see Table 4 in Appendix B).
Zero-Correlation Linear Attack on 20-round SIMON32
Let E denote the 20-round SIMON32 from round 0 to round 19. Suppose that the 11-round zero-correlation linear distinguisher given in Figure 4 covers from round 5 to round 15. We now present an attack on E based on this distinguisher by adding five rounds before the distinguisher and four rounds after the distinguisher, which is illustrated in Figure 5 .
Overall Strategy. For each of the 2
32 plaintext-ciphertext pairs, the attacker first guesses a part of the last 4-round subkeys k 16 , k 17 , k 18 , k 19 and partially decrypts the ciphertext up to the state R 16,{7} . Then he guesses a part of the first 5-round subkeys k 0 , k 1 , . . . , k 4 and partially encrypts the plaintext up to the state L 5,{0} . Finally, the attacker computes the value of L 5,{0} ⊕ R 16,{7} .
11-round ZC Distinguisher 0000,0000,0000,0000 0000,0000,0000,0001
11-round ZC Distinguisher 0000,0000,0000,0000 0000,0000,1000,0000
Fig. 5. Add 5 rounds before and 4 rounds after the Distinguisher
The subkey bits related to the above partial encryption and partial decryption are shown in Figure 5 . We can see that 14 bits of k 0 , 10 bits of k 1 , 6 bits of k 2 , 3 bits of k 3 , one bit of k 4 , one bit of k 16 , 3 bits of k 17 , 6 bits of k 18 , 10 bits of k 19 , in total 54 subkey bits are related. For a guessed value of the 54 subkey bits, if the event that L 5,{0} ⊕ R 16,{7} is equal to 0 happens 2 31 times (i.e., the correlation of the linear equation L 5,{0} ⊕ R 16,{7} = 0 is exactly 0), then we take this guessed subkey information as a correct subkey candidate. According to [26] and the Wrong-Key Randomization Hypothesis given in [27] , for a wrong subkey candidate, the probability that the correlation of L 5,{0} ⊕ R 16,{7} = 0 is 0 can be estimated as
Thus the 54-bit subkey space can be reduced by a factor of 2 15 .33 approximately. In order to recover the master key value (i.e., k 0 , k 1 , k 2 , k 3 ), we further exploit the key schedule. Among 64 bits of the master key, 33 bits are suggested from the above procedure. Moreover, k 4 , k 16 , k 17 , k 18 , k 19 can be derived from the master key by using linear equations, therefore, one bit of k 4 , one bit of k 16 , 3 bits of k 17 , 6 bits of k 18 and 10 bits of k 19 (totally 21 subkey bits) can be converted to 21-bit information for the remaining 31 bits of the master key. More specifically, for each of the 33 master key bits suggested above, the attacker can guess 10-bit information of the master key and then obtain 21 linear equations of 21 variables (i.e., the remaining 21 bits of the master key). By solving these linear equations with Gaussian elimination, the attacker can retrieve the master key value.
Efficient Subkey Recovery.
We now explain the strategy for efficiently performing 4-round partial decryption and 5-round partial encryption with 54-bit subkey guess. By using a straightforward approach, we need to do the partial decryption and partial encryption for 2 32 plaintext-ciphertext pairs with 2 54 subkey guesses. This requires 2 32+54 = 2 86 computations, which is much more than the exhaustive key search. In our attack, we adopt the divide-andconquer technique delicately to reduce the time complexity. More specifically, checking whether L 5,{0} ⊕ R 16,{7} = 0 has a zero correlation or not can be done by counting the number of occurrences of the event that L 5,{0} R 16,{7} is equal to "00" or "11" (If this number is 2 31 , then the correlation of L 5,{0} ⊕ R 16,{7} = 0 is exactly zero). To do this, we first guess the 20 bits of the last four-round subkeys relevant to R 16,{7} and get the value of L 0,{0∼15} R 0,{0,2∼14} R 16,{7} (regarded as the starting state), based on which, we set a starting counter and update the state bit-by-bit for the first six rounds (the counters corresponding to the states are obtained accordingly). Eventually we derive the counter with respect to the value of L 5,{0} R 16,{7} . Note that all the bit-by-bit state transitions are chosen elaborately to make the time complexity of our attack optimal, and all the counters involved in this attack need to be initialized firstly. The reason why we do not use all the plaintext-ciphertext bits related to L 5,{0} and R 16,{7} as the starting state is that the size of this state is too large for us to mount an efficient attack. The detailed attack procedure is given as below. (c) Guess subkey bits k 0,{9} , k 0,{3} , k 0,{4,10} , k 0,{11} , k 0,{5} and k 0,{0,6∼7,12∼14} step by step (see Table 5 in Appendix B). According to [26] and the Wrong-Key Randomization Hypothesis given in [27] , the probability that a wrong subkey candidate for η is kept after Step 5 can be approximated as 
Zero-Correlation Linear Attacks on SIMON48
Similarly, by using the 12-round zero-correlation linear distinguisher in Table 4 
Discussion and Conclusion
Discussion. As mentioned before, applying our experiments to SIMON48 is hard due to the large block size especially when the number of active bits is close to the block size. We then did experiments in which the number of active bits is 24 (i.e., half of the state) and 30 (i.e., 5/8 of the state), and found 9 and 10-round distinguishers, respectively. Interestingly, according to the experimental results for SIMON32 in Table 3 , we observed that if half of the state (16 bits) are active, 9-round distinguishers can be found, and if 5/8 of the state (20 bits) are active, 10-round distinguishers can be derived. It seems that the ratio between the number of active bits and the block size for SIMON48 matches with SIMON32 well, thus we may find 13-round distinguisher with 7/8 of the state (42 bits) being active and 15-round distinguisher with 47 active bits for SIMON48. It remains an open problem to apply this experimental approach efficiently to block ciphers with larger block size.
Conclusion.
In this paper, we investigated the security of SIMON32 and SI-MON48 by using integral, zero-correlation linear and impossible differential cryptanalysis, and obtained some new results on these ciphers. Firstly, we introduced a novel approach to find a 15-round integral distinguisher of SIMON32, with which an efficient attack was mounted on 21-round SIMON32. This approach gives a new way of constructing integral distinguishers for block ciphers with small block size. Secondly, we presented attacks on 20-round SIMON32, 20-round SIMON48/72 and 21-round SIMON48/96 delicately based on 11 and 12-round zero-correlation linear hulls of SIMON32 and SIMON48 respectively. Our attacks improved the previous best results (appeared in FSE 2014) in terms of the number of attacked rounds. Moreover, we proposed improved impossible differential attacks on SIMON32 and SIMON48. It is expected that our results could be beneficial to the security evaluation of SIMON. Forward 0 0000,0000,0000,0000,0000,0001 0000,0000,0000,0000,0000,0000 1 0000,0000,0000,0000,0000,0000 0000,0000,0000,0000,0000,0001 2 0000,0000,0000,0000,0000,0001 ?100,000?,0000,0000,0000,0000 3 ?100,000?,0000,0000,0000,0000 ??10,000?,?000,00?0,0000,0010 1000,00?0,0000,0000,0000,000? 2 1000,00?0,0000,0000,0000,000? 0000,0000,0000,0000,0000,0010 1 0000,0000,0000,0000,0000,0010 0000,0000,0000,0000,0000,0000 0 0000,0000,0000,0000,0000,0000 0000,0000,0000,0000,0000,0010 
